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INTRODUCTION
In 2017, under a new Federal Communications Commission (FCC) director,
the FCC removed the current net neutrality regulations and developed a plan for
protecting an open Internet with fewer regulations.1 As of 2018, the former net
neutrality regulations have officially been repealed. Many U.S. citizens and
others around the world worry that this will have a negative impact on consumers
and allow Internet service providers and Internet platforms to take advantage of
consumers if left unregulated. While the current scheme in the United States is
not centered around a highly regulated Internet, there are many countries that

* Juris Doctor Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2020. Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and
Psychology, Vanderbilt University, 2014. I would like to thank the members of the Notre Dame Journal
of International & Comparative Law for their review of this note in preparation for publication.
1
FEDERAL COMMC’NS COMM’N, WC DOCKET NO. 17-108, FCC 17-166, DECLARATORY RULING,
REP. AND ORDER (Jan. 4, 2018).
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have taken a more rigorous stance on protecting neutrality on the Internet. Net
neutrality and platform neutrality have more recently become prominent topics
around the world.
This Note will examine the European Union’s net neutrality regulations,
France’s recently adopted platform neutrality regulations, and the United States’
current lack of Internet regulations. It will also discuss whether the United States
should rethink its decision to abandon net neutrality and adopt either the
European Union or French approach to Internet regulation. To understand how
the regulations exist in their current state around the world, this Note will begin
with the history of Internet regulation in the European Union, France, and the
United States. This Note will then analyze the current regulations for net
neutrality, platform neutrality, and a discriminatory Internet regime that lacks
formal legal regulation. This Note will evaluate the effectiveness of each
approach both from an economic standpoint and in terms of social impact. This
Note will conclude with a recommendation for the United States moving
forward in an Internet-driven world.
I. HISTORY OF EUROPEAN INTERNET REGULATION AND THE CURRENT
REGULATORY SCHEME
A. NET NEUTRALITY
Since the early 1990s and the beginning of the surge in Internet usage, the
European Union (EU) has been concerned with how Internet service providers
should be regulated. In March of 2002, the EU passed Directive 2002/22/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council (the “Directive”) on universal
service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and
services (Universal Service).2 The Directive’s intent was to define the type of
universal service obligations of telecommunications and network services.3 It
stated that each member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) would be able
to define the obligations of its universal service providers and that those
obligations would not be viewed as anti-competitive, so long as they are
administered in a transparent, non-discriminatory, and competitively neutral
manner.4 At the time the Directive was passed, the primary method of Internet
service was through dial-up Internet connection that was directly linked to
telephone networks.5 Therefore, the Directive was linked to both forms of
telecommunication. This was the first time the EU began addressing the issue of
Internet neutrality. Various other regulations and directives were passed by the
EU from 2003 through 2015. These include: Directive 2002/58/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the
processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic

2
Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on Universal
Service and Users' Rights Relating to Electronic Communications Networks and Services (Universal
Service Directive), 2011 O.J., (L 108/51).
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
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communications sector, Regulation No. 1211/2009 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 25 November 2009 establishing the Body of European
Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC), and Regulation No.
531/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2012 on
roaming on public mobile communications networks within the Union (recast).6
In 2015, the EU passed its first regulation that directly addressed the issue
of Internet neutrality and amended prior directives and regulations. Regulation
No. 2015/2120 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November
2015 set out the measures for regulating open Internet access.7 Article 1 of the
regulation defines the subject matter and scope of the regulation as
“establish[ing] common rules to safeguard equal and non-discriminatory
treatment of traffic in the provision of Internet access services and related endusers’ rights.”8 Article 2 provides definitions for the regulation.
Article 3 of the regulation discusses the safeguarding of open Internet access
among the EU states and includes five restrictions. The first restriction states
that Internet users have certain rights that include accessing and distributing
information and content, using application services, and using one’s own choice
of equipment to access the Internet.9 These rights are not impeded by the Internet
user’s location, the location of the Internet provider, or the location of the
destination or origin of the information.10 The second restriction deals with
agreements between Internet users and providers of Internet access. This
restriction states that the agreements dealing with conditions and characteristics
of Internet services (for example, price, data volumes, speed) are not allowed to
limit the rights given to Internet users in the first restriction.11 The third
restriction requires Internet service providers to treat all Internet traffic equally.
This means that the Internet service provider may not discriminate, restrict or
interfere with Internet traffic based on the sender or receiver, the content of the
Internet activity, the applications used, or equipment used by Internet users.12
However, this third restriction imposes limitations on its explanation of treating
all Internet traffic equally. This restriction does not prevent an Internet service
provider from implementing reasonable Internet traffic measures. The restriction
goes on to explain reasonable Internet traffic measures as those that are
transparent, non-discriminatory, proportionate, and based on objectively
different service quality instead of commercial considerations.13 The restriction

6
Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 Concerning
the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector
(Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications), 2002 O.J. (L 201); Regulation No. 1211/2009 of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 Establishing the Body of European
Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC) and the Office, 2002 O.J. (L 337); Regulation No.
531/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2012 on Roaming on Public Mobile
Communications Networks Within the Union (Recast), 2012 O.J. (L 172/10).
7
Regulation No. 2015/2120 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015
Laying Down Measures Concerning Open Internet Access and Amending Directive 2002/22/EC and
Regulation No. 531/2012 on Roaming on Public Mobile Communications Networks Within the Union
531/2012, Official Journal of the European Communities, 2015 O.J. (L 310/1).
8
Id. at 8.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
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goes on to state that beyond the management measures set forth above, the
Internet service providers shall not block, slow down, alter, restrict, interfere
with, or degrade certain content or applications. However, they may except as
made necessary to comply with EU legislative acts or national legislation that
complies with EU law, to preserve the integrity and security of the network for
Internet users, or to prevent network congestion as long as equivalent categories
of Internet traffic are treated the same.14 The fourth restriction requires that any
Internet traffic management measure may only include processing of an Internet
user’s personal data if the processing of that data is necessary and proportionate
to meet the objectives from the third restriction. It states that the processing of
personal data may only occur in accordance with Directive 95/46/EC and
Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council.15 The fifth
and final restriction in Article 3 states that Internet service providers are free to
offer services in addition to Internet access services that optimize certain
content, applications, or services, when it is necessary for a particular quality
level for the Internet user.16 However, those providers may only offer those
additional services if the network has the capacity to do so without hurting the
availability or quality of other users’ Internet access.17
Article 4 of the regulation sets forth the transparency measures required by
Internet service providers in their contracts for Internet service.18 The contracts
must set forth certain information, give clear and comprehensible explanations
of the service relating to volume, speed, and services, available remedies for
disputes, and publication of certain information.19 Article 5 addresses the
regulation and enforcement of Articles 3 and 4 which are to occur by national
regulatory authorities with the guidance of BEREC.20 Article 6 states that the
penalties for failing to abide by the regulation will be defined individually by
the member states and must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive enough
so as to make sure the regulation is being properly implemented.21
In August of 2016, BEREC published guidelines for following Regulation
No. 2015/2120.22 Article 5(3) of Regulation No. 2015/2120 expressly gives
BEREC the power to issue guidelines on net neutrality for reliance by national
regulatory authorities.23 The Regulation went into effect as of April 30, 2016
and remains in effect today.

14

Id. at 8–9.
Id. at 9.
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id. at 10.
21
Id.
22
Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (2016) BEREC Guidelines on the
Implementation by National Regulators of European Net Neutrality Rules, BoR (16) 127, https://berec.
europa.eu/eng/netneutrality/.
23
All You Need to Know about Net Neutrality Rules in the EU, BEREC, https://berec.europa.eu/
eng/netneutrality/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2019).
15
16
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B. PLATFORM NEUTRALITY
The Internet neutrality regulations imposed by the EU are the minimum net
neutrality restrictions that must be enforced by the member states. Certain
member states have chosen to go beyond the limitations imposed by the EU and
develop either stricter regulations for Internet neutrality or adopt other forms of
Internet regulation of neutrality. France in particular has adopted laws for the
implementation and regulation of platform neutrality.
The development of platform neutrality legislation began in May 2014,
when the French National Digital Council (FNDC) published a report on
platform neutrality.24 The report laid out four sets of recommendations deemed
as priority areas to ensure neutrality by and within the Internet and more
particularly Internet platforms.25 The first recommendation focused on
bolstering the effectiveness of the law in relation to digital platforms. The FNDC
recommended making better use of current laws and curbing legal and economic
uncertainty, using rating agencies to gauge neutrality levels, getting
transparency guarantees from platforms and making them available to users, and
receiving guarantees from the platforms that their models are sustainable.26 The
next recommendation was to ensure data system fairness when used by
platforms.27 This means that platforms are benefiting from collecting personal
data and digital footprints and this information needs to be organized and kept
in compliance to guarantee sustainable development.28 This can be done through
introducing a general obligation of fair usage of all data that goes beyond the
notion of final usage, giving users final control over the data concerning their
online activities and the implication of the use of that data, fostering data fluidity,
moving beyond personal data and developing a legal framework for digital
footprints, creating heightened transparency and information requirements for
platforms, and maintaining fairness between dominant platforms and their
users.29 The third recommendation was to invest in skills and knowledge to
bolster competitiveness.30 This means developing knowledge of the digital
world in support of this overarching strategic approach to platform neutrality
and using that knowledge to develop digital literacy for individuals, businesses,
and the community.31 The last recommendation of the FNDC was to set the
proper conditions to allow alternative neutral platforms to emerge.32 This is
achieved by promoting an open digital development model and building a
sustainable digital society by promoting these values and recommendations
nationally to other countries.33 After going through its recommendations, the
report defines platform neutrality as the protection of the well-being of citizens

24
FRENCH DIGITAL COUNCIL, FRENCH DIGITAL COUNCIL REP. ON PLATFORM NEUTRALITY,
OPINION NO. 2014-2 (2014).
25
Id. at 6.
26
Id. at 7–8.
27
Id. at 9–12.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id. at 13.
31
Id. at 13–14.
32
Id. at 15–17.
33
Id. at 15.
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through ensuring that the Internet’s role as a catalyst for innovation, creation,
expression, and exchange is not undermined by development strategies that
close it off.34 Further, platform neutrality includes transparency and equity in
collecting, processing, and retrieving information; non-discrimination between
forms of expression and shared content; non-monopolization of information
production means; non-discrimination in terms of socioeconomic status for
access to platforms; and non-discrimination in the technical compatibility or
interoperability requirements with platforms.35 The EU did not adopt a platform
neutrality approach following the publication of the FNDC’s report but instead
developed net neutrality regulations.
Following the EU’s adoption of Regulation No. 2015/2120, France passed
Law No. 2016-1321 for a Digital Republic of 7 October 2016, which defined the
Internet as a public right similar to that of water and electricity and laid out the
definition of an online platform operator.36 The law imposed new obligations on
companies that fell under the definition of online platform operator, which aims
to ensure loyalty towards consumers by encouraging transparency and the
respect of information duties.37 About a year later, France passed three decrees
that focused on the loyalty of online platform operators and worked to
implement the law which had been set forth in Law No. 2016-1321 for a Digital
Republic.38 These decrees set forth rules for online platform providers to ensure
that the webpages are providing consumers with fair, clear, and transparent
information.39 Discussion of the three decrees regarding platform neutrality
follows.
1. Decree No. 2017-1434 of 29 September 2017
Decree No. 2017-1434 focuses on the information obligations of online
platforms operators.40 These obligations apply to Article L111-7 of the French
Consumer Code and became enforceable as of January 1, 2018.41 Article L1117(I) of the French Consumer Code defines an online platform operator as any
natural person or legal entity offering, on a professional basis, free of charge or
against payment, an online communication service to the public, based on either:
(1) the ranking or referencing, through the use of computerized algorithms, of
contents, goods, or services offered or uploaded by third-parties; or (2) the
bringing together of several parties for the sale of goods, the provision of

34

Id. at 19.
Id. at 19.
36
Julien-Alexis Defromont, Obligations for Digital Platforms Under French Consumer Law: New
Implementing Decrees Regarding Transparency and Loyalty Published, FIELDFISHER TECH. AND
OUTSOURCING BLOG, (Nov. 21, 2017), https://technologyandoutsourcingblog.fieldfisher.com/2017/
obligations-for-digital-platforms-under-french-consumer-law-new-implementing-decrees-regardingtransparency-and-loyalty-published.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.; Décret 2017-1434 du 29 septembre 2017 relatif aux obligations d'information des opérateurs
de plateformes numériques [Decree No. 2017-1434 of September Sept. 29, 2017 on the Information
Obligations of Digital Platform Operators], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.],
Sept. 29, 2017, https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/decret/2017/9/29/ECOC1716647D/jo/texte.
35
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services, or the exchange or sharing of contents, goods, or services.42 The
information obligations of online platform operators includes providing
information on the methods for referencing, dereferencing, and ranking content,
disclosure of the existence of a capitalistic link or remuneration between the
platform operator and the referenced provider, and additional obligations for
those online platform operators whose activity falls within the scope of Article
L111-7(I)(2) of the French Consumer Code.43 Article L111-7(I)(2) includes
online platform operators which function as a “marketplace” such that it brings
together several parties for the sale of goods, the provision of services, or the
exchange or sharing of contents, goods, or services.44 The online platform
operators which are contained in Article L111-7(I)(2) must make the following
information available when applicable: (1) the capacity of the persons authorized
to submit an offer of goods and services, including in particular their status as a
professional or a consumer; (2) a description of the contact-intermediation
service and the nature and purpose of the contracts that can be concluded under
this service; (3) the price of the contact-intermediation service or the method
used to calculate this price, as well as the price of any additional paid services,
whenever the costs of these services are borne by the consumer; (4) the payment
procedure for the financial transaction and the way it is managed, whether
directly or by a third party; (5) the insurance and warranties offered by the
platform operator; and (6) the dispute resolution process and the role of the
platform operator in such process.45
2. Decree No. 2017-1435 of 29 September 2017
Decree No. 2017-1435 sets a connections threshold from which online
platform operators shall develop and disseminate best practices to enhance the
loyalty, clarity, and transparency of the information transmitted to consumers.46
This regulation applies only to operators with more than five million unique
users per month and became enforceable as of January 1, 2019.47 This regulation
is aimed at holding high volume online platform operators to a higher standard
of transparency to its consumers.

42
CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 111-7 (Fr.); Flore Foyatier, Handbook on the New
Transparency and Fairness Requirements Imposed on Operators of Digital Platforms Since January 1,
2018, SOULIER AVOCATS, (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.soulier-avocats.com/en/handbook-on-the-newtransparency-and-fairness-requirements-imposed-on-operators-of-digital-platforms-since-january-12018/.
43
See Foyatier, supra note 42.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.; Décret n° 2017-1435 du 29 septembre 2017 relatif à la fixation d'un seuil de connexions à partir
duquel les opérateurs de plateformes en ligne élaborent et diffusent des bonnes pratiques pour renforcer
la loyauté, la clarité et la transparence des informations transmises aux consommateurs [Decree No. 20171435 of September 29, 2017 on the Determination of the Connection Threshold Above Which the
Operators of Digital Platforms Must Establish and Make Available to Consumers Good Practices
Guidelines Aimed at Strengthening the Fairness, Clarity and Transparency of the Information Provided
to Consumers], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.], (Oct. 5, 2017),
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/decret/2017/9/29/ECOC1716648D/jo/texte.
47
Foyatier, supra note 42.
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3. Decree No. 2017-1436 of 29 September 2017
Decree No. 2017-1436 sets forth the information requirements relating to
online consumer notices.48 This applies to Article L111-7-II of the French
Consumer Code and became enforceable as of January 1, 2018.49 These
regulations for online consumer notices apply to any online platform operator
whose primary or secondary purpose consists of the collection, moderation, or
publication of online consumer reviews.50 The decree defines online consumer
reviews as the expression of the opinion of a consumer from his or her
consumption experience based on either any qualitative or quantitative elements
of evaluation.51 It does not matter whether or not the consumer has bought the
product or service which he or she is reviewing.52 The following information
must be available on the webpage near the reviews: (1) the existence or absence
of a procedure to monitor the reviews; (2) the date of the publication of each
review and the date of the consumer’s experience described in the review; and
(3) the criteria used for classifying the reviews, including the reviews that are
just displayed in chronological order.53 There are also additional requirements
for information that must be made available on a specific easily accessible
section of the webpage depending on whether the reviews are monitored or not.
Regardless of whether the reviews are monitored or not, the platform operator
must make available the existence or absence of compensation in exchange for
a review and the maximum period of time the review is published and will stay
online.54 If the reviews are monitored by the online platform operator, then the
following information requirements also apply: (1) the main features of the
monitoring process at the time the reviews are collected, moderated, or
published; (2) if applicable, the possibility to contact the consumer who wrote
the review; (3) the possibility or impossibility to amend a review, and if
applicable the procedure for amending a review; and (4) reasons why the
publication of a review may be refused by the online platform operator.55
If not specified in the particular decree, the information referenced in the
decrees must be published in a section of the platform’s webpage.56 It must be
easily accessible from all pages on the webpage and the information must not
require a user to identify him or herself in order to access the information.57
Article L131-4 of the French Consumer Code contains the penalties for noncompliance with the regulations for online platform operators.58 Non-

48
Id.; Décret n° 2017-1436 du 29 septembre 2017 relatif aux obligations d'information relatives aux
avis en ligne de consommateurs [Decree No. 2017-1436 of September 29, 2017 on Information
Requirements Relating to Online Consumer Reviews], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE
FRANÇAISE [J.O.], (Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/decret/2017/9/29/ECOC
1716649D/jo/texte.
49
Foyatier, supra note 42.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id.
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compliance is punishable by an administrative fine of up to EUR 75,000 for
natural persons and EUR 375,000 for legal entities.59
II. U.S. NET NEUTRALITY HISTORY AND REVOCATION
A. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF INTERNET REGULATION
Internet regulation and net neutrality have a long history in the United
States. To fully understand the history of Internet regulation, it is important to
first look at how other forms of transmissions were regulated before the
development of the Internet. In 1934, under President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt, the Communications Act of 1934 was passed.60 This Act regulated
interstate and foreign communication by radio or wire.61 The main development
from this Act was replacing the Federal Radio Commission with the Federal
Communications Commission (the “FCC”) and transferring regulation of
telephone communications from the Interstate Commerce Commission to the
FCC.62 Therefore, under the Act, the FCC became the commission regulating
and overseeing United States telephone, telegraph, television, and radio
communications.63 Additionally, the Act expanded the idea of common carriers
to electronic communication, which was a novel concept at the time.64 Under the
Act, the electronic communication forms, defined as common carriers, were
required to be end-to-end neutral in their transmission of data.65 The seminal
case in defining the end-to-end neutrality requirement of the Act was Hush-APhone Corp. v. United States.66 In this case, the petitioner argued that the FCC’s
ruling that its product was deleterious to the telephone system and injured the
services rendered by the telephone service was incorrect and the petitioner’s
complaint regarding the tariffs imposed by the telephone service should not have
been dismissed by the FCC.67 The Court of Appeals agreed with the petitioner
and ruled that the FCC’s decision that the Hush-A-Phones were a public
detriment was erroneous.68 Therefore, Hush-A-Phone Corp’s product was being
subjected to unwarranted tariffs by phone operators because the product’s utility
was privately beneficial and had no public detriment.69 The court remanded the
case back to the FCC to review the tariffs imposed by the telephone service.

59

Id.
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2013).
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Tyler Elliot Bettilyon, Network Neutrality: A History of Common Carrier Laws 1884–2018,
MEDIUM (Dec. 12, 2017), https://medium.com/@TebbaVonMathenstien/network-neutrality-a-historyof-common-carrier-laws-1884-2018-2b592f22ed2e.
65
Id.
66
Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
67
Id. at 267.
68
Id. at 269.
69
Id.
60
61
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B. THE RISE OF THE INTERNET ERA
The Internet first emerged in the 1980’s. Throughout the 1980’s and
early 1990’s, the only form of connection to the Internet was dial-up through
one’s telephone service provider.70 Based on this model, the Internet at the time
qualified as a common carrier under the Communications Act of 1934.
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the “Telecom Act”) was passed
under President Bill Clinton.71 The Telecom Act did not completely supplant the
Communications Act of 1934 but made changes under Title II common
carriers.72 The goal of the Telecom Act was to promote competition in
communication services by allowing anyone to enter the communications
business while still ensuring that all citizens had access to advance
communications systems at affordable prices.73 The Telecom Act was the first
piece of legislation in the United States to directly address Internet access.74 It
required that the FCC facilitate the deployment of broadband Internet
capabilities to all Americans.75
In 2002, under President George W. Bush, the FCC adopted a
declaratory ruling, which classified broadband Internet service providers as Title
I information service providers under the Communications Act of 1934 instead
of Title II common carriers or telecommunication services.76 This resulted in the
Internet becoming largely unregulated.77 The FCC stated that its decision was
promoted by policy goals that included encouraging the ubiquitous availability
of broadband access to the Internet to all Americans, ensuring that broadband
services exist in a minimal regulatory environment that promotes investment and
innovation, and developing an analytical framework that is consistent across
multiple platforms.78 In 2005, various petitioners sought review of the FCC
declaratory ruling by the United States Supreme Court. In National Cable &
Telecommunications Association. v. Brand X Internet Services, the United States
Supreme Court ruled that the FCC’s interpretation of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996 classifying broadband Internet service providers as information
service providers instead of telecommunications services was a reasonable
interpretation.79 The Court reasoned that the high-speed wire was used in
connection with the information-processing capabilities provided by Internet
access, and that transmission was a necessary Internet access component.80

70
Belle Mellor, The Slow Death of Dial Up, ECONOMIST (Mar. 10, 2007), https://www.economist.
com/technology-quarterly/2007/03/08/the-slow-death-of-dial-up.
71
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1996).
72
Joseph Gattuso, The United States Telecommunications Act of 1996, GLOBAL COMMC’NS
INTERACTIVE (1998), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/legacy/opadhome/overview.htm.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Hanlong Fu et al., The Impact of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 in the Broadband Age, 8
COMM. ADVANCES IN COMM. AND MEDIA RES. (2015).
76
Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable & Other Facilities; Internet
Cable Declaratory Ruling; Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet Over
Cable Facilities, Declaratory Ruling and Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 02-77, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798 (2002).
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Serv., 545 U.S. 967, 1000 (2005).
80
Id. at 990.
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C. NET NEUTRALITY
The term “net neutrality” was initially coined by University of Virginia
Professor of Law Tim Wu in 2003.81 His paper examined the concept of net
neutrality in telecommunications policy.82 Wu’s paper was one of the first
analyses of net neutrality and made a case for a broadband discrimination regime
as an alternative to the structural regime of completely open access.83
In 2005, the FCC published its policy of new principles to preserve and
promote the open and interconnected nature of public Internet.84 It outlined the
following principles that the FCC aimed to incorporate into its ongoing
policymaking activities: (1) consumers are entitled to access lawful Internet
content of their choice; (2) consumers are entitled to run applications and
services of their choice, subject to the needs of law enforcement; (3) consumers
are entitled to connect their choice of legal devices that do not harm the network;
and (4) consumers are entitled to competition among network providers,
application and service providers, and content providers.85
In 2007, various Comcast consumers began to notice that the company was
limiting the usage of certain technologies such as BitTorrent over their Comcast
broadband connections.86 After various tests were done by organizations such as
the Associated Press, it was revealed that Comcast was in fact targeting peer-topeer Internet traffic.87 Free Press filed a complaint with the FCC.88 The FCC
ruled that Comcast’s practices were in violation of the Telecom Act, and its
policy was an unreasonable form of network regulation.89 The FCC cited to
Comcast selectively impeding and blocking certain types of applications such as
BitTorrents.90 It found that this disparate treatment directly opposed the goal of
the Telecom Act and posed significant risks of anticompetitive abuses by
companies.91 Comcast was ordered to disclose to the FCC its network
management practices, submit a new compliance strategy to describe its plan to
transition from discriminatory practices to nondiscriminatory practices, and
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disclose to the FCC the details of the new network management system to be put
into practice.92 Comcast appealed the decision by the FCC, and the D.C. Court
of Appeals in Comcast Corp. v. FCC ruled in favor of Comcast on the grounds
that the FCC did not have the ancillary authority to regulate Comcast under the
Telecom Act.93
In response to Comcast v. FCC and growing concern over an open and free
Internet, the FCC developed more regulations in its Open Internet Order of
2010.94 Adopted on December 21, 2010, the Open Internet Order set forth three
basic rules: (i) transparency; (ii) no blocking; and (iii) no unreasonable
discrimination.95 Transparency regulations stated that fixed and mobile
broadband providers must disclose the network management practices,
performance characteristics, and terms and conditions of their broadband
services.96 The no blocking rule applies to fixed broadband providers in that they
may not block lawful content, applications, services, or non-harmful devices,
and mobile broadband providers may not block lawful websites or block
applications that compete with their voice or video telephony services.97 The last
rule of no unreasonable discrimination only applies to fixed broadband providers
in that those providers may not unreasonably discriminate in transmitting lawful
network traffic.98
In 2011, Verizon sued the FCC over its Open Internet Order, arguing that
the order exceeded the FCC’s authority.99 In Verizon v. FCC, the D.C. Court of
Appeals set out to determine whether the FCC’s rules fell outside of the scope
of its statutory authority.100 The court ruled that the no blocking and no
unreasonable discrimination provisions from the Open Internet Order could only
be shown to apply to common carriers, and, therefore, since broadband providers
are specifically separated from common carriers per the Telecom Act, the FCC
could not impose those rules on broadband providers.101
In 2013, the Federal Trade Commission (the “FTC”) updated its 2002 Letter
that advised search engines about the potential for consumers to be deceived in
violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act.102 The letter advised search engines to
ensure that consumers are able to distinguish natural search results from
advertisements delivered by the search engine.103
Under the administration of President Obama in 2015, the FCC voted to
regulate broadband Internet service as a public utility and adopt various rules in
its Order on Remand, Declaratory Ruling, and Order (the “Net Neutrality
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Order”).104 Specifically, the FCC reclassified broadband Internet access service
providers to fall under Title II of the Telecom Act.105 The Net Neutrality Order
defined broadband Internet access service as:
A mass-market retail service by wire or radio that provides the
capability to transmit data to and receive data from all or
substantially all Internet endpoints, including any capabilities
that are incidental to and enable the operation of the
communications service, but excluding dial-up Internet access
service. This term also encompasses any service that the
Commission finds to be providing a functional equivalent of the
service described in the previous sentence, or that is used to
evade the protections set forth in this Part.106
In addition, the Net Neutrality Order set forth the following rules to protect
consumers from tactics that threaten the open Internet:
1. Clear, Bright-Line Rules
The clear, bright-line rules adopted by the FCC included banning the use of
blocking, throttling, and paid prioritization.107 The no blocking rule protected
the rights of consumers in that a consumer who subscribes to a retail broadband
Internet service must get what he or she pays for.108 The ban on blocking states,
“[a] person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet access service,
insofar as such person is so engaged, shall not block lawful content, applications,
services, or non-harmful devices, subject to reasonable network
management.”109 The no throttling rule guards against degradation targeted at
specific uses of a customer’s broadband connection.110 This rule protects against
a broadband service from avoiding the no blocking rule by effectively but not
actually blocking a website or application by degrading the Internet traffic to a
point where the application or website is essentially unusable.111The order states,
“[a] person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet access service,
insofar as such person is so engaged, shall not impair or degrade lawful Internet
traffic on the basis of Internet content, application, or service, or use of a nonharmful device, subject to reasonable network management.”112 The last rule
prohibiting paid prioritization protected against the use of payment for a
broadband Internet service provider to manage its network in a way that benefits
particular services, content or devices.113
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The rule states that a person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet
access service, insofar as such person is so engaged, shall not engage in paid
prioritization. ‘Paid prioritization’ refers to the management of a broadband
provider’s network to directly or indirectly favor some traffic over other traffic,
including through the use of techniques such as traffic shaping, prioritization,
resource reservation, or other forms of preferential traffic management, either
(a) in exchange for consideration (monetary or otherwise) from a third party, or
(b) to benefit an affiliated entity.114 Both the no blocking and no throttling rules
are subject to an exception for “reasonable network management.”115 Paid
prioritization has no exception for reasonable network management because
paid prioritization is a business practice and not a network management
practice.116 Reasonable network management is defined in the Net Neutrality
Order as a practice that has a primarily technical network management
justification, but does not include other business practices. A network
management practice is reasonable if it is primarily used for and tailored to
achieving a legitimate network management purpose, taking into account the
particular network architecture and technology of the broadband Internet access
service.117
2. No Unreasonable Interference or Unreasonable Disadvantage to
Consumers or Edge Providers
As gatekeepers of information on the Internet, the FCC decided it is the duty
of broadband Internet access providers to make sure they are not using that
gatekeeping role to unreasonably interfere with or unreasonably disadvantage
consumers or edge providers.118 This rule acts as a catch all provision for
anything that the clear, bright-line rules would not outright prohibit.119
The rule mentions that any person engaged in the provision of broadband
Internet access service, insofar as such person is so engaged, shall not
unreasonably interfere with or unreasonably disadvantage (i) end users’ ability
to select, access, and use broadband Internet access service or the lawful Internet
content, applications, services, or devices of their choice, or (ii) edge providers’
ability to make lawful content, applications, services, or devices available to end
users. Reasonable network management shall not be considered a violation of
this rule.120
3. Enhanced Transparency
This rule from the Open Internet Order of 2010 remained in full effect and
was not revised by the FCC in the Net Neutrality Order. The rule states that a
person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet access service shall
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publicly disclose accurate information regarding the network management
practices, performance, and commercial terms of its broadband Internet access
services sufficient for consumers to make informed choices regarding use of
such services and for content, application, service, and device providers to
develop, market, and maintain Internet offerings.121
Shortly after the Net Neutrality Order was adopted, the issue of whether the
FCC was able to reclassify broadband Internet access providers to fall under
Title II was brought before the D.C Court of Appeals.122 In U.S. Telecom
Association v. FCC, the D.C. Court of Appeals ruled that the FCC had statutory
authority under § 706 of the Telecom Act to reclassify broadband as a
telecommunication service.123
D. THE REPEAL OF NET NEUTRALITY
In 2017, under a new administration, the FCC voted 3-2 to repeal the Net
Neutrality Order.124 The repeal was adopted on December 14, 2017, with the
publication of the FCC’s Declaratory Ruling, Report and Order (the “Restoring
Internet Freedom Order”).125 The repeal reversed the reclassification of
broadband Internet access providers from telecommunications services back to
information services.126 The FCC additionally eliminated the rules created in the
Net Neutrality Order.127 The FCC also reverted the transparency requirements
for Internet service providers back to what was required under the Open Internet
Order of 2010.128 The Restoring Internet Freedom Order stated the reasons for
the repeal were that (i) the cost of the rules to innovation and investment
outweigh any benefits, (ii) there is no identifiable source of legal authority to
justify the conduct rules adopted under the Net Neutrality Order, and (iii)
conduct rules are unnecessary because the transparency rule together with
antitrust and consumer protection laws ensure that consumers have redress if any
Internet service provider engages in behavior that is contrary to Internet
freedom.129
In response to the repeal, several technology companies filed lawsuits
in an attempt to preserve net neutrality protections.130 Additionally, twenty-two
state attorneys general filed lawsuits to preserve net neutrality.131 The lawsuit,
led by New York’s attorney general, argues the Administrative Procedure Act
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prohibits the FCC from “arbitrary and capricious” redactions to existing
policies.132
Many states have adopted legislation to reinstate the net neutrality rules
within their borders. California adopted net neutrality legislation as of August
2018.133 Governors in several states, including Montana, New York, and Hawaii,
have signed executive orders requiring Internet service providers that do
business with the state to adhere to net neutrality principles.134
III. BALANCING THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACT OF INTERNET
REGULATION
The history and current rules for three forms of Internet regulation across
the globe have now been reviewed. The EU adheres to net neutrality regulations,
France enforces platform neutrality regulations, and the United States regulates
the Internet through transparency rules along with general antitrust and
consumer protection laws. A comparison and determination of which regulation
method is preferable may take many different factors into account. For this
analysis, the two primary factors that will be evaluated are economic impact and
social impact.
A. NET NEUTRALITY
The EU’s current net neutrality regulations have been in place for several
years. However, in this short period of time, various scholarly articles have been
written on whether the EU should keep the current regulations, add platform
neutrality regulations, or let the market regulate itself. The European Parliament
stated in 2017 that “the need for net neutrality and fair and non-discriminatory
access to online platforms is a prerequisite for innovation and a truly competitive
market.”135 Yet, innovation and a competitive market are arguably more in line
with less regulation. Thus, net neutrality prioritizes the prevention of negative
social impacts but fails to have a positive economic impact on Internet service
providers, platforms, or consumers.
From an economic standpoint, studies have shown that innovation and a
competitive market actually benefit from a discriminatory Internet access regime
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instead of a net neutrality regime.136 A purely economic view supports that a
discriminatory regime is more beneficial in terms of investments, innovation,
and total welfare.137 When Internet service providers are allowed to differentiate
between Internet traffic speeds and access, the investment by both platforms and
Internet users increases.138 However, while this increases total welfare, it can
disproportionately harm certain groups. These investments negatively impact
platform profits. Additionally, more research is needed on whether a user’s
utility in higher broadband speeds is commensurate with the investment made
by that user.139
In terms of social impact, the regulation of Internet service providers under
net neutrality allows users to exercise their rights to access and distribute
information.140 Net neutrality also enables businesses to reach consumers.
Therefore, neutral Internet access can be said to be essential for competition and
innovation on the Internet as it relates to platforms and consumers. Additionally,
a discriminatory regime disproportionately and negatively impacts small
platforms.141 Smaller platforms may not have the capacity to invest in higher
broadband speeds which would stifle innovation if the platform required those
speeds to function properly. Lastly, under a net neutrality regime, there is little
to no risk of sabotage by Internet service providers to platforms.142 Internet
service providers have no benefit to slowing down Internet speeds or blocking
access if the principles of net neutrality are in place.
Therefore, net neutrality lacks certain economic benefits but has a positive
social impact. It lacks the total economic benefits that a discriminatory regime
may have but takes important steps to protect society and its right to access and
distribute information. The EU’s net neutrality regulations have various social
benefits but may not be the perfect fit for the United States which has a tendency
to prioritize economic incentives over social concerns.
B. PLATFORM NEUTRALITY
France’s recent platform neutrality laws have sparked many discussions.
While the long-term effects and challenges to these laws have not yet been
realized, various scholars have begun to predict what will occur under the
platform neutrality regime. Platform neutrality goes a step further at regulating
the Internet by focusing on the neutrality of platforms that the Internet service
providers give consumers access to. In its purest form, platform neutrality has
economic benefits and a positive social impact. However, while France has
taken the most substantial steps of any country toward adopting pure platform
neutrality, it is practically impossible for Internet platforms to be completely
neutral. Some form of a ranking system must necessarily be used any time
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content is listed. France’s platform neutrality rules focus on ensuring that
Internet platforms provide consumers with fair, clear, and transparent
information.
In regard to economic impact, the platform neutrality principles differ from
those seen in net neutrality. The total welfare is lower when search platforms
use a sponsored ranking system for content or products that are equal in
quality.143 The sponsored ranking system is a form of discriminatory regime that
France’s platform neutrality rules do not explicitly ban. Instead, France
addresses the issue of a sponsored ranking system by requiring clear and
transparent information regarding how items, websites, and the like are ranked
or listed by a platform. In a sponsored ranking system, the top position in the
sponsored rank is the most valuable.144 The value of this position means that the
provider of the product in this position pays a search platform for this top ranked
position, but in order to make a profit, it will then have to charge more for its
product.145 Therefore, the search platform will profit to the detriment of both the
consumer and the provider of products.146 The consumer will be left worse off
because their choice will be factually limited.147 Consumers also will not
consider the less prominent product or content providers, and they will be
directed to higher-priced or less relevant content or products.148 France’s
platform neutrality principles guard against the consumer confusion that occurs
in a sponsored ranking system.
The social impact of platform neutrality takes the strictest approach of the
three to protecting freedom of speech and transparency. Current legal
frameworks are unable to account for Internet platforms’ unique role in the
world which necessitate the rules for platform neutrality. Dominant platforms
on the Internet have taken on a utility-like role that comes with various
obligations, including as an infrastructure for freedom of expression.149 Unlike
a physical store, platforms have an endless amount of diverse information
available.150 Because of this new role, platform neutrality is adding information
to search platforms and limiting the power of those platforms to censor
information.151 Additionally, platform neutrality guards against the distortion of
a level playing field for competing products or content providers and the
deterioration of content quality and content variety displayed on platforms.152
As discussed under economic impact, competing products in a sponsored
ranking system that are on all practical accounts equal will not be treated equally
on the platform and ultimately by the consumer. This will mislead the consumer
in purchases and in his or her perception of product prices and availability.153
Deterioration of the market may occur because product and content providers
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who do not receive priority will be at a disadvantage and be forced to exit the
market.154 Under France’s platform neutrality rules, these issues will not occur.
The goal of France’s law is to force Internet platforms to provide fair, clear, and
transparent information to consumers. By enforcing these requirements, France
will avoid the negative social impacts that occur without platform neutrality.
Therefore, platform neutrality has positive economic and social impacts.
Regulating platforms maximizes total welfare and ensures the protections of
freedom of speech and transparency. In addition, platform neutrality protects
consumers and ensures that platforms are not pushed out of the market unfairly.
C. A DISCRIMINATORY REGIME
The United States’ Restoring Internet Freedom Order focused on removing
the net neutrality rules. The current state of the Internet is a discriminatory
regime that is regulated through the transparency principle stated by the
Restoring Internet Freedom Order and general antitrust and consumer protection
rules and regulations. Proponents of this view have many arguments for why this
is the correct way to monitor the Internet. Some argue that there should not be
specific laws governing complex areas in need of regulation and that instead the
Internet should be assessed by general legal principles that have always
existed.155 On the other side of the argument, authors argue that a new regulatory
framework needs to be developed because the current legal framework,
including antitrust and consumer protection laws, are not sufficient for the
specific needs of Internet regulation.156 While acknowledging both sides of the
argument, we will focus our review of a discriminatory regime in terms of
economic and social impact. A discriminatory regime has a predominantly
positive economic impact but has negative social consequences.
A discriminatory regime for the Internet is economically beneficial.157 Marc
Bourreau compared net neutrality regimes and discriminatory regimes from a
purely economic standpoint.158 In this analysis, he used the idea of Internet
service providers that had two “lanes” of Internet traffic; a priority or fast lane
and a regular lane.159 In this economic analysis, he concluded that a
discriminatory regime is more beneficial in terms of investments, innovation,
and total welfare.160 In terms of investments, a discriminatory regime that
includes priority and non-priority Internet speeds will have platforms investing
in increased broadband capacity.161 By allowing platforms to invest in higher
Internet speeds, the Internet service providers are receiving additional revenues
from the fees associated with the higher speeds.162 An increase in broadband
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capacity increases demand and the costs but also leads to an increase in the
revenues an Internet service provider can receive.163 Innovation increases with
a discriminatory regime because certain platforms are not able to effectively
work on the “regular lane” or general Internet speed and would be left out of the
market without the ability to invest in the priority Internet speeds.164 Internet
service providers invest more in capacity in a discriminatory regime so that the
total number of active platforms is greater.165 The total welfare is increased by a
discriminatory regime although the exact impact on welfare to the individual
parties cannot be calculated as a practical matter.166 The overall effect on the
economy in a discriminatory regime is always positive in that prioritization leads
to a more efficient system.167 The total congestion of Internet traffic is lowered
by a discriminatory regime because Internet service providers are better able to
manage Internet traffic when there are multiple “lanes” of traffic.168 Therefore,
from an economic standpoint, there is the most to gain from having an open
Internet based on a discriminatory regime.
However, looking at the social impact of a discriminatory regime, there are
a variety of problematic areas. There must be some monitoring of the Internet to
make sure that smaller platforms are not being disproportionately and negatively
impacted. Additionally, in a discriminatory regime, Internet service providers
are more readily able to sabotage or manipulate both platforms and
consumers.169 Sabotage or manipulation can occur by Internet service providers
in various ways. First, there is the fear of degradation of the non-priority access
“lanes” in order to extract higher profits from priority access users. By lowering
the broadband access of the non-priority “lane,” Internet service providers can
force platforms to upgrade to the high priority “lane” out of necessity to ensure
consumers are able to access their platform which leads to profits for the Internet
service provider.170 Internet service providers may also sabotage access to
certain platforms. This leaves consumers worse off in that they are not given
access to all of the information that should be readily available to them on the
Internet. In turn, this will lead to the deterioration of content quality and variety
because platforms will leave the market if they are being disadvantaged by
Internet service providers and unable to make a profit.171 Manipulation of
consumers may also occur by platforms in a discriminatory regime. Platforms
act as the gatekeepers of content and may use profiling practices to gain an
advantage over consumers.172 Platforms may use consumer data to restrict
certain products or content available to them. This may result in discriminatory
categorizations of consumers that can perpetuate existing inequalities.173
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While the United States’ discriminatory regime is economically efficient, it
lacks some of the social protections that are desirable for a society. A
discriminatory regime benefits investment, innovation, and the overall welfare
of society but at a cost to the freedom and growth of consumers and platforms.
IV. THE PUSH TOWARD NEUTRALITY: IS A DISCRIMINATORY REGIME
GOOD ENOUGH?
While the discriminatory regime is the most economically efficient of the
three methods, it should be applied in conjunction with specific net neutrality
rules and more transparency regulations for both Internet service providers and
Internet platforms. As previously stated, a discriminatory regime that includes
limited transparency rules relating to Internet service providers and general
antitrust and consumer protection laws is not enough to protect against the social
concerns that arise in a discriminatory Internet regime.
General antitrust and consumer protection laws are not properly tailored to
be effective methods of Internet protection. The FTC has broad authority to
police conduct that goes against fair competition or that harms consumers.174
However, the FTC has taken little action to protect consumers, platforms, or
even Internet service providers relating to Internet usage. Because the FTC is a
primarily reactive agency and is not engaged in rulemaking, it is extremely
difficult for the FTC to understand the principles guiding improper Internet
activity as it falls under antitrust or consumer protection laws.175 The FTC is not
an appropriate group to police Internet usage absent guidelines from another
authority. Therefore, antitrust and consumer protection laws in their current form
are not effective means for regulating the Internet, and other steps must be taken.
The United States’ transparency rule takes a step to mitigate negative social
impacts but does not go far enough. The current rule for transparency states that
an Internet service provider must publicly disclose information about its network
management practices, performance characteristics, and commercial terms of its
broadband Internet access services.176 Transparency in and of itself does not
limit the behavior of the Internet service providers, and therefore, further steps
should be taken. First, the transparency rules for Internet service providers
should be reviewed and revised so as to ensure Internet service providers are not
taking advantage of consumers or platforms. Next, the United States should look
at France’s platform neutrality regulations to begin adopting transparency
requirements for platforms within the United States. While the word platform
neutrality may conjure up images of a platform that is void of all preference and
completely neutral, this is not a plausible or correct reading of France’s
regulations which are labeled as platform neutrality laws. France’s platform
neutrality laws are primarily laws of transparency; enforcing platforms to

174
Michael Santorelli, After Net Neutrality: The FTC is the Sheriff of Tech Again. Is it Up to the
Task?, FORBES (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/washingtonbytes/2017/12/15/the-game-ison-the-ftc-tech-regulation-post-net-neutrality/#7b757cbb575a.
175
Id.
176
47 C.F.R. § 8.1 (2018).

2020

NEUTRALITY IN THE MODERN WORLD

103

disclose the practices that are being used that are not substantively neutral.
Platforms should be required to acknowledge their active role in managing
content and products, and this can be done through strict transparency guidelines
similar to those of France.
Additionally, the FCC should adopt net neutrality rules. While the EU’s net
neutrality rules are comprehensive, the negative economic impact that would
occur from implementing the same standards should incentivize the United
States to develop more specific and streamlined rules. The FCC should review
the net neutrality rules imposed in 2015 under the Net Neutrality Order and
consider revisions and then reinstate the rules. The clear bright-line rules from
the Net Neutrality Order all correlate to the social concerns that a discriminatory
regime brings to light. Blocking and degradation are two prominent concerns
from a social impact standpoint that were directly addressed by the Net
Neutrality Order. Reinstatement of specific net neutrality rules and more
comprehensive transparency rules for Internet service providers and platforms
would allow for positive economic growth while still limiting that growth to
account for social concerns.
A discriminatory Internet regime with limited transparency rules and
general antitrust and consumer protection laws do not go far enough to protect
society. Therefore, the current discriminatory regime in place in the United
States must be paired with additional transparency rules that include Internet
platforms and net neutrality rules that prevent Internet service providers from
engaging in sabotage of either consumers or platforms.
CONCLUSION
After close examination of the EU’s net neutrality regulations, France’s
recent platform neutrality regulations, and the United States’ current
discriminatory regime that imposes transparency requirements on Internet
service providers, it is clear that there is no “one size fits all” model for
regulation of the Internet. Each country has a different history for how its own
regulatory scheme has progressed and the policy initiatives that the country
deems important in regulating the Internet. The EU’s use of net neutrality takes
a strong stance on protecting social welfare but does not necessarily take the best
approach towards economic optimization of the Internet. Platform neutrality
utilized by France takes the United States’ transparency rules for Internet service
providers a step further by enforcing platforms to abide by transparency
standards and imposing fines for the failure to do so. The United States’
discriminatory Internet regime, which incorporates transparency requirements
for Internet service providers, is the most economically beneficial model for
regulation but fails to protect from the negative impacts on society. By looking
to France’s use of platform neutrality and the United States’ former Net
Neutrality Order, the United States can implement certain rules that will help
protect society without stifling the economic benefits of a discriminatory
Internet regime.
Looking forward to the future of Internet regulation, there are almost
certainly still changes on the horizon. The EU’s net neutrality laws may change
as soon as 2019. BEREC has been tasked with reviewing and revising the
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guidelines it published in 2016. While the Regulation takes precedent over the
national law of member states, the guidelines present very detailed
recommendations of what net neutrality means and should look like throughout
Europe.177 The Regulation gives independent national telecom regulators the
power and the mandate to protect net neutrality in their respective countries.178
To do this, the independent regulators are told to take the utmost account of the
guidelines issued by BEREC.179 Various telecom companies in the EU have
been arguing for BEREC to loosen its guidelines to make the use of 5G phone
network service more viable and economically impactful.180
In France, Decree No. 2017-1435 of 29 September 2017 became
enforceable as of January 1, 2019. In the coming years, the decrees for platform
neutrality, including their enforcement and revisions, should be monitored both
for economic and social impacts. The long-term impacts of platform neutrality
regulations should be reviewed in depth as more is learned from observing the
enforcement or lack thereof of these decrees.
In the United States, the battle over how the Internet should be regulated
continues. More than half of the states have found one way or another to oppose
the most recent act of repealing net neutrality by the FCC.181 The issue seems to
fall across party border lines with Democrats in favor of net neutrality rules and
regulations and Republicans favoring less regulation.182 States have taken
opposition through suing the FCC, introducing state legislation, and enhancing
requirements for companies receiving state or government grants.183 However,
the FCC is fighting back. The Department of Justice sued California in late 2018
for its law regarding net neutrality based on the federal government’s
jurisdiction over interstate commerce.184 While no judgments have been
rendered in these cases, the decisions should be monitored as they will have an
impact on the future of Internet regulation. Additionally, the 2020 presidential
election may bring about more changes in Internet regulation.
Further research should be done on the different forms of Internet
regulation’s specific economic and social impact. In addition, there are other
methods of measuring the effectiveness of forms of Internet regulation that were
not addressed in this Note. Further consideration of other measurements should
be taken into account when moving forward with revisions to Internet regulation.
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